Expert system support for HST operations by Cruse, Bryant & Wende, Charles
N89-10076
/
t ,;:, j c, __ :jZ
Expert System Support for HST Operations
by
Bryant Cruse
Lockheed Missiles and Space Corp.
Code 400.8, NASA/GSFC
Greenbelt, MD 20771
f tf
V'
!
Charles Wende _ _4
Space Telescope Project - Goddard : _
Code 400.2, NASA/GSFCGreenbelt, MD 20771
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An expert system is being developed to support vehicle
anomaly diagnosis for the Hubble Space Telescope. Following
a study of safemode entry analyses, a prototype system was
developed which reads engineering telemetry formats, and,
when a safemode event is detected, extracts telemetry from
the downlink and writes it into a knowledge base for more
detailed analysis. The prototype then summarizes vehicle
events (limits exceeded, specific failures, etc.). This
prototype, the Telemetry Analysis Logic for Operations
Support (TALOS) uses the Lockheed Expert System (LES) shell,
and includes over 1600 facts, 230 rules, and 27 goals.
Although considered a prototype, it is already an
operationally useful system.
The history leading into the TALOS prototype will be
discussed, an overview of the present TALOS system will be
presented, and the role of the TALOS system in contingency
planning will be delineated.
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The Hubble Space Telescope (HST) is not, for the most part,
an autonomous spacecraft. Its engineering telemetry will be
monitored for vehicle health and safety on a nearly
continuous basis from the ST Operations Control Center
(STOCC) at the NASA/Goddard Space Flight Center in
Greenbelt, MD. STOCC personnel must recognize and respond
to anomalies by initiating the appropriate contingency
procedures. One exception to this dependance on ground
personnel is the vehicle safemode system. An on-board
computer continually tests critical vehicle subsystems.
When one of these tests fails, a predefined sequence of
stored commands is exercised to place the vehicle in a safe
configuration, or a "safemode". Several safemodes have been
defined and are activated depending on the nature and
severity of the malfunction. Each safemode is designed to
isolate the failed subsystem or component and then to place
the vehicle in a stable, powerconserving attitude. The
safemode system buys time for the STOCC personnel to respond
to a serious on-board situation. It is still incumbent upon
the STOCC to recognize that the vehicle has entered
safemode, to determine which safemode test or tests have
failed, and to diagnose the cause of the problem. These
tasks must be acomplished before the vehicle can be
recovered and the science schedule resumed. The development
of tools that can speed up these analyses, therefore, has a
very high payoff for enhancing mission operations.
Analysis of a vehicle safemode event requires analyzing raw
telemetry which appears in one of a variety of formats
depending upon, among other things, the type of safemode
entry (which is to be determined!). Following a safemode
recovery study in 1984, it was recognized that, because of
the complexity of this task, some sort of ground software
assistance would be needed if the HST were to be operated
efficiently. Lockheed Missiles and Space Company, the
Mission Operations Contractor (MOC) for HST, undertook to
write a prototype expert system (the Telemetry Analysis
Logic for Operations Support, TALOS, system) to attack this
problem in the summer and fall of 1986.
In its current state of development, TALOS operates in
either of two modes. In the monitor mode, rALOS scans a
telemetry history file (optionally starting from a specified
time) and looks for the existence of any safemode event; if
an event is found, it automatically changes to the
diagnostic mode. Upon entering the diagnostic mode, rALOS
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extracts the values of specific telemetry monitors from the
history file and writes them to the system knowledge base.
The TALOS system then performs the following analysis tasks:
determines whether the HST itself is in a safemode;
and if so,
assesses the sequence of vehicle events,
summarizes what happened and when, and
verifies that the vehicle response was correct.
If desired, the operator can ask for a rationale explaining
why any particular conclusion was reached. The TALOS system
consists of four major subsystems, of which two were
provided by the MOC and two were provided in the Lockheed
Expert System (LES) shell:
- a Data Interface (developed by the MOC)
- a Knowledge Base (populated by the MOC),
- an Inference Engine (provided by LES), and
- a Knowledge Interface (also provided by LES, but
customized for this application).
The Data Interface consists of an adaptive telemetry
extraction program written in FORTRAN. Presently it reads
data only from an HST engineering telemetry history tape;
enhancements will allow reading real-time engineering
telemetry streams or disk-based data. The extractor selects
170 monitors (data points) out of the 4690 monitors
available, and performs quality checks before reformatting
and forwarding the data. Eleven telemetry formats are
available, with up to 4015 parameters being downlinked in
any one format. Each of these parameters are sampled at
least once every two minutes, and some are sampled many
times in that interval. The telemetry format itself may be
changed autonomously by the HST spacecraft when a safemode
situation is encountered. Format changes in the telemetry
stream are recognized automatically and are handled almost
instantaneously by the Data Interface. The set of monitors
being extracted can be changed in less than five seconds
under the control of either the console operator or the
expert system. The telemetry commutation schemes are stored
in a database and are subject to change during the mission.
However, a different commutation scheme can be loaded into
rALOS in a matter of seconds under either operator or expert
system control. Thus, old data can be revisited for
testing, training, or compacison purposes without requiring
significant software changes or substantial operator
intervention.
The Knowledge Base includes 1600 facts, 230 rules, and 27
goals. As an entity, it is already more knowledgeable about
safemode entry than the average console operator was during
the Ground System Thermal-Vacuum Test. Knowledge is
represented in four ways:
backward chaining, goal-driven rules
(if ... then...),
forward chaining, data-driven rules
(when ... then...),
facts stored as slots in frames, and
goals which can be run concurrently with dynamically
changeable priorities.
The following example illustrates a Backward Chaining Rule
in the Knowledge Base:
HEADING:
RULE NAME
FROMWHOM
ACT TIME
AUTHORENGLISH
SMEVENTI'
BRYANT CRUSE'
17 NOV 1986'
If, after a gyro test failure in low'-
mode, the gyros are found in high'-
mode, the software response to the'-
test failure is nominal.'
IF:
TYPE ENTRY
ACTOR
ACTION VERB
OBJECT
'STARE'
,RESULT[SMTESr(PNAME=SMTEST1)]'
'FAILED'
TYPE ENTRY
ACTOR
ACTION VERB
OBJECT
'STARE'
,VALUE[MONITOR(PNAME=QDFHILO)]'
'0'
TYPE ENTRY
ACTOR
ACTION VERB
OBJECT
'ACTION'
'ROBOT(PNAME=LES)'
'PRINT'
'The DF-224 has responded normally to '-
,DESCRIPTION[SMEVENT(PNAME=SMEVENTI)].'
THEN:
TYPE ENTRY
ACTOR
ACTION VERB
OBJECT
LIKELIHOOD
'srArE'
,EFFECr[SMEVENr(PNAME=SMEVENTI)] '
'VERIFIED NOMINAL'
'I00 '
rhis rule fires when the condition following the THEN
statement is exactly matched by a condition following an IF
statement of another rule or by an Hypothesis statement of a
goal. When the rule fires the system then tries to find a
match for the conditions following the IF statement in in
the knowledge base or in the THEN clauses of other rules.
Note the ACTION statement (third entry under IF). LES will
execute such a statement in an IF clause when the other two
statements are matched. In this case, a text block is
written to the screen to inform the user of the result.
The following example illustrates a Forward Chaining rule:
HEADING:
RULE NAME
FROM WHOM
ACT TIME
AUTHOR ENGLISH
SMWHEN-9'
BRYANT CRUSE'
9-DEC-1986'
When the value of DTMFDC (telemetry '-
format data content monitor) is '-
determined and it is not equal to '-
145 (S format) or 48 (C format) then'-
the number of safemode events equals'-
the value safemode fault recorder'-
pointer divided by 8.'
WHEN:
TYPE ENTRY
ACTO_
ACTION VERB
'STATE CHANGE'
'VALUETMONITOR(PNAME=SSFRPTR)],
'IS DETERMINED'
TYPE ENTRY
ACrOR
ACTION VERB
'STARE'
'VALUE[MONITOR(PNAME=DTMFDC)],
'IS DETERMINED'
TYPE ENTRY
ACTOR
ACTION VERB
OBJECT
'STATE'
'VALUE[MONITOR(PNAME=DTMFDC)]'
'145'
TYPE ENTRY
ACrOR
ACTION VERB
OBJECT--
'STARE'
'VALUE[MONITOR(PNAME=DTMFDC)]'
'48'
THEN:
TYPE ENTRY
ACTOR
ACTION VERB
OBJECT
'STATE CHANGE'
'NUMBER OF EVENTS [EVENT_SEQUENCE(PNAME='-
'SMSEQUENCE) ] '
'VALUE[MONITOR(PNAME=SSFRPrR)] / 8'
This rule will fire only when all four conditions following
the WHEN statement are met. Those conditions are checked by
the system each time a condition defined by a TYPE ENTRY of
'STATE_CHANGE' undergoes some change in the knowledge base.
When the rule fires, the condition following the THEN
statement becomes true.
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The following example illustrates a simple category file
storing facts in slots in frames. This file defines the
different safemodes to the expert system. Any number of
attributes can be defined.
FILENAME:SAFEMODELEVEL.CAT
SAFEMODELEVEL
m
/*** ATTRIBUTE DEFINITIONS
ATTRIBUTE NAME ACTIVE
TYPE ATTRTBUTE ACTIVE 'TRUE-FALSE'
ASKABLE ACTIVE 'FALSE'
ATTRIBUTE NAME
TYPE ATTRIBUTE
ASKABLE
GROUND COMMANDED
GROUND--COMMANDED
GROUND COMMANDED
'TRUE-FALSE'
'TRUE'
/*** TOKENS
PNAME
DESCRIPrION
'SMLEVEL0'
' NO safemode events have occurred.
PNAME
DESCRIPrION
'SMLEVELI'
' The vehicle is in Inertial Hold Mode. '
PNAME
DESCRIPrION
'SMLEVEL2'
' The vehicle is in Software Sunpoint
Safemode. '
PNAME
DESCRIPTION
'SMLEVEL3'
' The vehicle is in Hardware Sunpoint
Safemode. '
PNAME
DESCRIPTION
'SMLEVEL4'
' The vehicle is in Gravity Gradient
Mode. '
PNAME
DESCRIPTION
'SMLEVEL5'
' The vehicle is not in Safemode.'-
' However one or more safemode events
have occurred. '
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rhe following example illustrates a Goal with a default
)riority of 95:
PNAME
DESCRIPTION
GOAL PRIORITY
SUBJECT CATEGORY
FIND ALL SOLUTIONS
GOAL--RESULT PUTOUT
GOAL--MESSAGE
'SMGOAL4'
'determine the safemode level if
any'
'95'
'DETERMINE SAFEMODE LEVEL'
'TRUE' -- --
'FALSE'
'I am now determining whether
the vehicle'-
' has entered safemode and if so
what level.'
HYPOTHESIS
(ACTIVE[SAFEMODE LEVEL(PNAME=SMLEVEL0)] = TRUE >< '-
ACTIVE[SAFEMODE--LEVEL(PNAME=SMLEVELI)] = TRUE >< '-
ACTIVE[SAFEMODE--LEVEL(PNAME=SMLEVEL2)] = TRUE >< '-
ACTIVE[SAFEMODE--LEVEL(PNAME=SMLEVEL3)] = TRUE >< '-
ACTIVE[SAFEMODE--LEVEL(PNAME=SMLEVEL5)] = TRUE >< '-
ACTIVE[SAFEMODE_LEVEL(PNAME=SMLEVEL6)] = TRUE )'
Within LES it is possible to alter the priority of a goal and
cause a new line of reasoning to be pursued. This change is
implemented using a forward chaining rule of a type generally
called "Demons". An example of a demon follows:
HEADING:
RULE NAME
FROM WHOM
ACT TIME
AUTHOR ENGLISH
'SMWHEN-01'
'BRYANr CRUSE'
'II-AUG-1986'
'When no safemode events have occurred'-
' reduce the priority of Goal-6 to 0'
WHEN:
TYPE ENTRY
ACTOR
ACTION VERB
OBJECT
'STATE CHANGE'
'ACTIVE[SAFEMODE LEVEL(PNAME=SMLEVEL0)] '
'TRUE'
THEN:
rYPE ENTRY
ACTOR
ACTION VERB
OBJECT
'STATE CHANGE'
'GOAL_PRIORITY[GOAL(PNAME=SMGOAL6)],
'0'
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the Inference Engine provides the standard expert system
functions. While in the monitor mode, TALOS reasons in a
data-driven manner and awaits the detection of a safemode
event before proceeding with the analysis. 20 of the 27
defined goals are initially set to a priority of zero. Upon
entering the diagnostic mode, TALOS begins processing
goal-driven, backward chaining rules. Then, the priority of
a goal may be raised or lowered by data-driven forward
chaining rules, depending upon how the analysis proceeds.
(Did this fail? Are these monitors available in this
format?, etc.) New data can cause further refinements of
the priorities. Thus LES is capable of abandoning one line
of reasoning and switching to another course of analysis
depending upon what it discovers about the state of the HST
spacecraft.
The Knowledge Interface (user interface) uses windows to
keep the operator appraised of what it has found. At any
time, one window is maintaining summary statistics on
safemode events, while another window is giving details of
the ongoing analysis. At the conclusion of its analysis,
TALOS presents its findings and the operator may ask for a
printout, or may ask for a detailed rationale behind the
findings. By design, TALOS serves to advise the operator
and cannot of and by itself issue any corrective commands to
the HST spacecraft.
The TALOS has demonstrated its ability to scan a telemetry
history tape, to identify an initial safemode event, and to
analyse a complex sequence of events correctly. A
particularly complex but logically consistant series of
safemode events were placed on a telemetry history tape
using the Hardware/Software Laboratory at Lockheed in
Sunnyvale, CA. Analysis of the telemetry to decipher this
sequence would present a real challenge, even to the most
expert analyst, would typically require an hour. This
sequence of failures proceeds as follows:
First, the current in the vehicle's magnetic torquer
bars exceeds safe limits. This anomaly causes a
safemode test to fail, and an on-board computer
commands the vehicle to the first level of safemode:
Software Sunpoint.
As a result, the solar panels are commanded to
rotate. But, since there are no solar panels in the
laboratory, another safemode test fails.
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Next the battery depth-of-discharge fails through
two successive limits (logically, since the solar
arrays are mis-aligned). This last failure would
normally result in entry into the next level of
safemode: Hardware Sunpoint.
In this last level of safemode, a backup computer
shuts down the primary on-board computer. However,
the lab doesn't have a backup computer either, so
the vehicle response is again anomalous.
The printout produced at the end of the analysis clearly
shows this sequence of events. On an unloaded system, this
entire analysis takes only a few minutes.
TALOS should be understood as applying current technology to
the contingency analysis problem. Contingency planning
includes:
anomaly recognition,
immediate action definition,
diagnostictechniques, and
recovery plans.
Present TALOS capabilities include fault identification with
rationale. Contingency planning maps directly into present
and potential TALOS functions; the further development of
YALOS will build on our contingency planning. Conversely,
TALOS will provide a framework for codifying such planning.
By merging the two, it is expected that the TALOS development
will force higher degrees of organization, consistency and
completeness upon the contingency planning process. The cost
will be in training operations personnel to care and feed the
rALOS knowledge base, and in the time it takes for these
people to insert their contingency plans into the knowledge
base itself. However, by testing TALOS against HST
spacecraft or simulator data, the contingency analyses can be
validated directly, a more thorough testing of rALOS is
provided, and a training tool is provided for personnel.
Further, the self-documenting nature of the TALOS knowledge
base provides paper procedures when needed, while the
explanation feature of TALOS provides a teaching tool for new
personnel and develops rationales for some unexpected cases.
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Development costs thus far have been on the order of a few
months of effort and liberated time on a shared VAX/8600
(TALOS also operates quite well solo on a MicroVAX II/GPX).
The concept has been demonstrated, and its capabilities will
be expanded. The near-term development of additional TALOS
capabilities will proceed cautiously, as the a cost of
augmenting contingency planning with an expert system will
have to be ascertained. TALOS will not be immediately
expanded to cover all possible contingencies, but instead
will be directed at a small number of high return situations.
Three diagnostic modules will be added to service the
pointing control system (PCS), the electrical power system
(EPS), and the data management system (DMS), and these
modules will be limited to handling contingencies related to
vehicle safemodes.
The results to date have been very promising.
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